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Abstract 
The Tropical Storm Washi (locally known as Sendong) hit the major cities in the region of Northern Mindanao in Southern 
Philippines between December 16th and 17th, 2011. The flash floods brought by Washi resulted in a massive and 
unprecedented destruction of urban areas, causing, only in Cagayan de Oro, the displacement of 228,576 persons that 
represents almost 40% of the total city population, 5,801 houses were totally destroyed and 12,635 were partially damaged. 
Approximately 85% of the affected households were informal settlers of highly vulnerable and marginal areas located near 
the river banks. As a result, the post-disaster housing recovery projects focused on the resettlement of these communities as a
priority for permanent housing. 
In the following month of the disaster, the government announced an ambitious resettlement project to build more than 8,500 
houses in safer locations. The project implies a complex process in which each stakeholder has specific roles, responsibilities,
and approaches. Therefore, the success of the project depends on a large extent of the relationships among stakeholders, 
leadership and the decisions taken independently by each stakeholder who in turn is affected by other stakeholders’ decisions. 
This research examines the coordination mechanisms, criteria for decision making and the complex interactions among the 
different stakeholders involved in the housing reconstruction in Cagayan de Oro in the aftermath of Washi for a better 
understanding of the process which is needed for an effective management of the resettlement projects. 
© 2015 Sandra CARRASCO. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under organizing committee of I3R2 
2015
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1. Introduction 
    Natural disasters cause great loss and destruction, especially in highly dense urban areas; besides the physical 
consequences and casualties, these events cause functioning disruption of the affected communities and 
traumatic change of survivors’ lifestyle and living conditions [1][2]. The Asian Development Bank [3] ranked the 
Philippines as second most affected country by natural disasters in the Asia since 2000. From the variety of 
hazards, floods are by far the most frequently occurring in Asia and claim the highest numbers of victims. 
    The Philippines is exposed to different natural disasters; however the regularity of typhoons represents a 
permanent threat to the communities settled in vulnerable zones, because of the resulted flash floods and 
landslides. When the Tropical Storm (TS) Washi or locally known as Sendong, hit the city of Cagayan de Oro in  
Southern Philippines; between December 16th and 17th, 2011, the destruction was massive and unprecedented; 
41 of 80 barangays in the city were inundated (barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines,  
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equivalent to district or ward), and displaced about 228,576 persons that represents almost 40% of the city 
population [4][5].
    In Cagayan de Oro, the fast population growth and the unplanned city growth resulted in the establishment of 
marginal settlements or squatters [6]. Therefore, approximately 85% of the affected households by TS Washi 
belong to the informal housing sector [7], most of the settlements were located in the Cagayan River bank. 
Consequently the residents frequently experimented floods, however due to the intensity of TS Washi the 
residents were unable to cope with the flash floods. 
    Hence, the approach for post Washi housing recovery was to resettle squatter residents to safer locations, in 
order to protect them from the effect of future disasters. Additionally 86% of the post Washi housing recovery 
projects involved agency-driven resettlement. Therefore, this implied a complex process where each of the 
different stakeholders had a role, approaches and responsibilities [8]. In addition, the success of this process was 
conditioned to the inter actors relationships [9][10] and the decisions taken independently by each actor that is 
affected by other actors decisions [11].
    In general, the stakeholders involved in post-disaster recovery concentrate their efforts only on their 
implemented or funded projects, due to the pressure for quick results, lack of capacities or time, or the need to 
report punctual accomplishments to government agencies or donors. However, in order to analyze the 
effectiveness of the process it is necessary to understand comprehensively the different stages leading recovery 
and reconstruction. Therefore, this research aims to analyze the coordination mechanisms, criteria for decision 
making and the complex interactions among the different stakeholders involved in the long-term housing 
recovery in Cagayan de Oro in the aftermath of the TS Washi towards the resettlement of informal residents. 
2. Methodology and approach 
    The target of the analysis is the decision making process for long-term disaster recovery, focusing on 
provision of permanent housing in resettled sites, although the full process for housing recovery includes early or 
short-term shelter assistance such as emergency and transitional housing, which is briefly described. 
    In order to understand the interactions among stakeholders involved in the reconstruction process, primary 
data was collected during June and July 2014 through 15 conducted officials of the national and local 
government institutions, implementing agencies and donor/contractors presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Profiles of Interviewees 
Type of institution/organization Number of Interviews Date
LGU 5 09 July-5August 
GOV 3 21 July-5 August 
IA 7 09 July-21 August 
LGU: Interview to officials of Local Government Unit – Cagayan de Oro 
GOV: Interview to officials to National Governmental Offices for Region 10 in Cagayan de Oro 
IA: Interview to representatives/managers of Implementing Agencies (NGOs, Civil Organizations, others)
    For collecting and analyzing secondary data, literature review included reports from government agencies, 
NGOs, reports from independent agencies and research institutes. 
    The analysis of approaches for housing reconstruction is based on the classification proposed by the World 
Bank [2]. Therefore, in Cagayan de Oro 86% of the housing units were planned to be built through Agency-
Driven Reconstruction in Resettlement Site, the details and reasons are described in detail in the paper. 
Therefore, the main target of this study is the management and coordination of this type of resettlement. 
    For the analysis of the resettlement, the project process was adapted from the RIBA “Plan of Work” [12].
3. Context 
3.1 Permanent hazard exposure in the Philippines 
    The Philippines is a multi-hazard prone country, astride to the “Pacific Ring of Fire” and the “Typhoon Belt”. 
Hence the Philippines has an unusual high exposure to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tropical storms and 
typhoons. These potential hazards are combined with rapid and unplanned migration to already densely 
populated and low-lying urban areas, insufficient understanding of the impacts of disasters and lack of effective 
early warning systems related to extreme weather events [5]. Despite the permanent exposure to potential 
disasters, there are still different types of gaps for the implementation of a proactive legislation [5] and 
institutional structure to prevent, mitigate and respond to disasters and protection of vulnerable communities. 
3.2Pre disaster situation in Cagayan de Oro 
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    Cagayan de Oro historically attracted rural migrants that produced a rapid and uncontrolled urban growth as 
its population quadrupled from 1975 to 2010. These issues promoted the illegal establishment of squatter and 
slum settlements in public land, located in the central urban areas were established in the bank of the Cagayan 
River and near public markets that constitutes the residents’ places of employment [6]. Poor quality housing built 
with precarious materials, and limited access to basic services such as water, drainage and electricity. 
    Before TS Washi hit Cagayan de Oro, there were different warnings about the vulnerability of these 
settlements located along Cagayan de Oro River, including formally established settlements. For instance, a 2010 
study of the Xavier University already identified that barangays in central Cagayan de Oro were put at-risk of 
floods. [13]. Another geo-hazard assessment conducted by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) in July 
2009 also indicated that these areas were regularly affected by floods due to their location adjacent to Cagayan 
de Oro River. Additionally, survivors admitted that they knew the risks; however they remained unfazed because 
they were accustomed to regular floods. Many of the residents also indicated that even if they knew a typhoon 
with this magnitude would occur, they had nowhere to go due to landlessness [4].
3.3 Impact of TS Washi in Cagayan de Oro 
    This tropical storm crossed Northern Mindanao (Region 10). Washi was the 19th Tropical Cyclone that 
entered to the Philippine area of responsibility and was the second Tropical Storm that affected Mindanao in 
2011. On December 17th, 2011 water levels in major rivers drastically increased. The water level of Cagayan de 
Oro River reached 9.86 meters in contrast with the normal level of 2 meters [7].
    Although there is an average of 20 tropical storms that hit the Philippines every year, these events are not 
usual in Mindanao. According to the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, there was only an average of one typhoon 
every ten years crossing Mindanao from 1947 to 2008. 
    The severe flooding brought by TS Washi caused a total of 1,295 fatalities, 2006 injured and 802 reported as 
missing, In Cagayan de Oro 69,715 families displaced and 18,436 houses were damaged or destroyed. About 41 
barangays of the total of 80 were inundated. The damaged homes were located in flood prone barangays; most of 
them were located in the proximities of the Cagayan River bank. 
4. Post-disaster Housing Reconstruction in Cagayan de Oro 
    In this study, the resettlement process is analyzed referring to the stages of the Design-Construction-Operation 
Process (DCOP) [14] [15] and understanding the main questions for examine the process and the implications in the 
resettlement process [9]. The process analyzed was organized in four stages presented in Table 2: 
Table 2: Resettlement Stages and issues to be consider for evaluation. 
Stages Issues to be considered Evaluation of the resettlement process
1. Preliminary  
Strategic
Definition Identify the need of housing, initial
measures and legal framework, and
regulations, alternatives for post-
disaster reconstruction 
Who?
Identify the potential and actual 
participating actors in the process 
based in their abilities to contribute  
What? 
Recognize needed tasks in the process 
and possible roles to be assigned or
overtook by stakeholders 
Why?
Define common approaches and
objectives to be fulfilled in 
collaboration with stakeholders  
When? 
Preparation  
and Brief 
2. Planning  
and Design 
Conceptual / 
Development 
and Technical 
Design 
Preparation, planning, design,
coordination and definition of roles
of stakeholders, and the approach for
reconstruction. 
3. Construction 
Construction Mobilization of resources and
practical actions and decisions taken
by stakeholders as well as monitoring
of the progress of the projects. 
Monitoring/ 
Supervision 
4. Use 
Handover  
and Close Out 
Once the projects are completed, the
affected communities are allocated,
and they receive support for
community development. In Use 
Recognize the time appropriateness of
the decisions taken and the moves or 
actions taken.  
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4.1 Preliminary 
    In this stage there are two main aspects that will be analyzed: The initial measures adopted in the aftermath of 
TS Washi, initial shelter assistance and transitional shelters. 
4.1.1 The initial measures 
    The massive destruction left by TS Washi displaced almost 40% of the city population. The initial actions 
taken by the Local Government Unit (hereafter LGU) in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (hereafter DSWD) included to allocate the affected communities in public evacuation centers, tent 
cities, or planned camps supported by the national government, international and national NGOs and other non-
profit organizations. There were 42 operating evacuation centers where 65,046 persons look for shelter and 
163,530 persons outside evacuation centers [7].
    Another vital action taken was the determination of “No-Built Zones” (Fig. 1) by the LGU, which were 
declared not suitable for any urban use. This decision was taken in observance of the Philippine Water Code that 
establishes the observance of the three-meter easement of rivers. These illegal and vulnerable settlements 
became the target for a massive resettlement, and then the disaster became afterward the trigger of resettlement. 
    Subsequently, in early January the national and local government announced an ambitious program to build or 
rebuild 8,599 houses only in Cagayan de Oro, targeting a completion term of one year after TS Washi [7]. The 
land for resettlement sites was purchased by the LGU prior to Washi, to be used for social housing projects or in 
case of emergency. However, this goal has not been accomplished even two years after the disaster. 
     
Fig. 1: (a) Location Cagayan de Oro and Path of Typhoon Washi. Source: Author based on National Statistical 
Coordination Board of the Philippines; (b) Cagayan de Oro City, Affected Areas and No Built Zone. 
4.1.2 Initial shelter assistance 
    Three to four weeks after Washi, some residents started to return to their original homes, and started 
reparation works supported by different local, national or international NGOs which distributed repair kits. 
4.1.3 Transitional shelter 
    The plans from the government were centered in permanent housing solutions or permanent housing; however, 
the situation in the crowded evacuation centers and camps did not meet the basic Sphere Standards for shelter 
[16][17]. Thus, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) together with the IOM, identified the needs and gaps in the 
humanitarian response. Understanding the required time for the completion of permanent housing, both CRS and 
IOM started Transitory Housing Programs in Cagayan de Oro. 
    In Cagayan de Oro, transitional settlements were located in different urban and peri-urban areas. Some 
transitional settlements were considered also for permanent housing. However, most of victims allocated in 
transitional shelters had to face another relocation and consequently the stress that this process implies. 
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4.2 Planning and design 
4.2.1 Inter agency coordination mechanism 
    There were different coordination bodies established in order to organize the recovery efforts and 
collaboration among different stakeholders and in each stage of the post-disaster response and reconstruction. 
a. Philippines’ ”permanent clusters” 
    The National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) is the main government coordination body for post-
disaster response at national and regional levels; it is responsible of providing overall guidance in response to a 
disaster and liaising with the international humanitarian community. In 2007 the Cluster Mechanism, which was 
set in 1991 by UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations, was institutionalized by the NDCC in the 
Philippine’s disaster management system. Thus, eleven clusters were designated that are led by government 
departments in collaboration with international humanitarian agencies. 
    The first coordination bodies activated were the Post-Disaster Response Clusters, each cluster is essentially a 
“sectoral group” that has been established in order to fill the gaps and to ensure adequate preparedness and 
response. The Shelter cluster took the responsibility to coordinate the early shelter assistance. 
b. Strategic Advisory Committee (SAG) 
    The government agency responsible for the coordination of assistance during the emergency phase was 
DSWD which was in charge of addressing the needs of informal settled families during the recovery phase, 
while the National Housing Authority is responsible for the long-term needs of formal settled families. 
    In the area of shelter, both DSWD and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) in Region10 have played a key role 
taking the leadership and ensuring appropriate coordination with the international humanitarian community. 
DSWD is the Shelter Cluster’s designated government counterpart and its roles include liaising with the 
government emergency agencies and chairing the Cluster’s meetings in Cagayan de Oro (see Fig. 2). OCD is in 
charge of leading the Cluster’s Strategic Advisory Committee (SAG). 
Fig. 2: Coordination Bodies for Early Housing Assistance. Source: Author, Modified from Philippine Red Cross 
c. Local Inter-Agency Committee for Permanent Housing (LIAC) 
    In order to organize the decisions and actions leading the recovery of the built environment, mainly permanent 
housing, the LGU of Cagayan de Oro established the Local Inter-Agency Committee for Permanent Housing 
(hereafter LIAC), chaired by the city mayor, and the National Housing Authority (hereafter NHA). 
    The different stakeholders involved in reconstruction and recovery after TS Washi participated in the LIAC. 
In order to organize the actions taken in the process, four sub-committees were established (Fig. 3) and the 
organizations and agencies were allocated in each of them according to their capacities and expertise. 
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Fig 3: Function and Stakeholders participating in LIAC sub-committees. Source: Author, Based on NHA LIAC 
    The LIAC was the responsible for the coordination and decision making for resettlement, as well as the 
mediator between local and national government offices and humanitarian and private sectors. The leadership 
has been taken by the LGU of Cagayan de Oro, and the different offices involved. And later in August 2012, 
after a change on the local administration the further coordination and decision making was taken by the “Shelter 
and Housing multi Sectoral Task Force” that was created to undertake the LIAC functions. 
4.2.3 Land identification and site planning 
    Prior to the disaster, the city already had a draft of a Relocation Plan and had purchased land for housing 
informal settlers (called “Land Banking”), with support of NHA. After the disaster, the priority was to shelter the 
victims and these sites were proposed for the resettlement sites. 
    To have public land available was a great advantage in responding the relocation of the people in Cagayan de 
Oro. Additionally, some private institutions which provided land for emergency shelters or tent camps, expressed 
their willingness to donate land for permanent housing. However, the location of resettlement sites is 
unfavorable, away from the main commercial centers and city facilities located in the central area of the city (Fig. 
4) that challenges the restoration of the livelihood and development of the displaced communities. 
Fig. 4: Resettlement Sites in Cagayan de Oro 
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    The development of the plans and design of the sites was responsibility of the LGU, however for some sites it 
was done in coordination with the NHA, especially those ones that the houses were funded by NHA. For the 
planning of sites in privately owned land, the decisions were taken in coordination with implementing agencies. 
4.2.4    Definition of reconstruction approaches 
    The World Bank [2] defines five types of post-disaster housing reconstruction approaches: 
• Cash Approach (CA): Financial assistance without technical support for housing repair and reconstruction. 
• Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR): Conditional financial assistance together with regulations and technical 
support for reconstruction of houses and given directly to households. 
• Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR); Financial and/or material assistance channeled through community 
organizations and promoting their involvement in decision making and in managing the reconstruction. 
• Agency-Driven Reconstruction in-Situ (ADRIS); Refers to an approach in which a governmental or non-
governmental agency hires a contractor to replace damaged houses in their pre disaster location. 
• Agency - Driven Reconstruction in Relocation Site (ADRRS); Refers to an approach in which a governmental 
or nongovernmental agency hires a contractor to build new houses in a new site. 
    From these five approaches three were adopted for the Recovery of Cagayan de Oro: 
a) Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR); financial assistance was channeled through “neighborhood 
associations for shelter assistance” (NASA) or LGUs that are involved in decision making and in reconstruction 
management. This type of housing reconstruction/resettlement is carried out through the Community Mortgage 
Program (CMP) of the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC). 
    In response to TS Washi, SHFC set up a “express lane” facility in Cagayan de Oro to fast track the processing 
of applications of disaster affected families for loans. Despite the shortened process, it took about two years for 
an application to be approved [18]. Thus, only 2% of the housing recovery was covered through this system. 
b) Agency-Driven Reconstruction in-Situ (ADRIS); In Cagayan de Oro, the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) and 
IOM conducted on site reconstruction, in the destroyed or severely damaged houses of residents in the affected 
areas. The main criterion for being awarded with this assistance was to have the legal ownership of the land. So 
far the number of houses built following this modality represents 11% of the total planned (Table 3). 
c) Agency - Driven Reconstruction in Relocation Site (ADRR); This modality implies resettlement of Washi 
survivors whose former homes were located in No-Built Zones, or high risk areas, then the priority is to allocate 
them in safer areas. This has been the main focus for housing provision after Washi, where 86% of the needed 
houses have been built in relocation sites (Table 3). Through the selection of this approach, the process resulted 
to be faster than the other approaches (the first group of beneficiaries was transferred 4 months after the disaster). 
Table 3: Post TS Washi Housing Reconstruction Approach 
Approach Housing Planned 
No. %
a) Community-Driven Reconstruction 258 units 2% 
b) Agency-Driven Reconstruction in-Situ 1,268 units 11% 
c) Agency - Driven Reconstruction in Relocation Site 9,699 units 86% 
Totals 11,225 units 100% 
Source: NHA [20]
4.2.5 Projects’ funding 
    The funds for resettlement are provided by different agencies (governmental, NGOs and private corporations), 
according to the agreement between LGU, implementing agencies and donors. In the sites where the housing 
funds were provided by NHA and DSWD, the total cost per housing unit is approximately PhP 110,000.00 
(Approximately USD 2,500); 64% were provided by DSWD, this is considered as a donation for beneficiaries; 
and the rest 36% were provided by NHA, this is not clearly defined if it is a donation or the beneficiaries will 
have to pay it, the NHA officials are is still considering this. 
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4.2.6 Implementing Agencies’ screening and land allocation 
    The LGU through the meetings of the LIAC designated the sites and assigned an Implementing Agency or 
Partner (housing builder) according to their capacities and number of houses that can built based on their 
available budget. Then the builder agencies had to submit the needed documents to obtain the building permits, 
based on the minimum technical for specified in the National Building Code of the Philippines; and the 
Minimum Design Standards and Requirements for Economic and Socialized Housing Projects [19].
4.2.7 Housing design and construction permits 
    In LIAC meetings, the LGU and other government agencies (such as the NHA and DSWD) provided 
guidelines to be followed by the implementing agencies in order to avoid substantial differences between the 
housing to be built by various agencies that may cause problems among beneficiaries (Table 4). 
Table 4: Standards of Housing Design Parameters 
Parameters Standards Regulated by 
Budget PhP 110,000 (approximately USD 2,500) LIAC 
Lot Size Approximately 32.00 m2 LIAC, Standards Economic and 
Social Housing [19]Floor Area Approximately 21.00 m2
Housing Design
Variable depending on funding Agency and 
building NGO. 
Variable 
Materials Variable 
National Building Code [21]
Standards Economic and Social 
Housing [19]
Philippine Electrical Code 
National Plumbing Code 
Water Supply
xMandatory connection to appropriate public 
water system. 
x If public water supply system is not available, 
water supply system within the subdivision 
project has to be provided. 
Electrical Power 
Supply
xMandatory individual household connection to 
primary and alternate sources of power if 
service is not available. 
Drainage System
x The drainage system for economic and 
socialized housing projects shall be made of 
concrete lined canal with adequate capacity and 
with load bearing cover. 
Sewage Disposal
System
x Individual septic tank conforming to the 
standards and design of the Sanitation Code of 
the Philippines. 
    The criteria for housing design differed within the NGOs and other implementing agencies, the criteria 
adopted by major agencies working in Cagayan de Oro are described below: 
x Habitat for Humanity Philippines (hereafter HFHP), adopted housing typologies due to its close 
relationships with different government agencies, like “quadruplex” or row houses in which the priority 
was the construction of as many houses as possible. This NGO mostly followed established designs by 
DSWD and NHA and modified them in coordination with these agencies (Fig. 5).  
x For the design of the houses built by the NGO Gawad Kalinga (Hereafter GK), the decision about the 
typology of the housing was referenced by the standards of NHA and DSWD houses; however they 
finally adopted their own design for the row houses that they built (Fig. 5). 
x For the local NGO Oro Habitat (hereafter OH), the design was provided by HFH, since in this case OH 
acted as a contractor of HFH, which also supervised the quality and progress of the construction. 
x The houses provided by the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (hereafter FCCC) only followed the 
criteria of the minimum floor area, and the design itself was provided by the supplier in China who sent 
their qualified personnel for the assembly and train local skilled workers (Fig. 5). 
    The selection of the materials was in most cases the conventional, confined masonry and galvanized sheets for 
the roofing. The exception was the houses provided by the FCCC, since it was decided by the organization to 
provide pre-fabricated houses which were accepted by the LGU. 
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                            a)                                                        b)                                                        c) 
Fig. 5: (a) Permanent houses built by HFHP, (b) by GK and  (c) by FCCC in Calaanan Site. Source: Author 
4.2.8 Beneficiaries’ screening and selection 
    Simultaneously with the preparation for construction, the selection process of beneficiaries of the houses in 
resettlement sites were done, where the DSWD worked in coordination with the LGU to define a list of qualified 
beneficiaries to be granted with the permanent housing. 
    The priority was the beneficiaries whose houses were totally damaged, who were living in temporary shelters 
and in tent camps, additionally to single mothers with children, large families and people with disabilities. 
People in the evacuation centers were provided choices of resettlement sites. Also, some beneficiaries expressed 
that it was possible to request for a change in site. 
4.3 Construction 
4.3.1 Land development and construction of infrastructure 
    The LGU was responsible for preparation of the land and in coordination with the Department of Public 
Works and Highways worked on the construction of infrastructure (roads, public water and drainage lines).  
4.3.2 Housing construction 
    The construction of the houses was managed directly by each implementing agency. HFHP worked through 
their contractors or partners (that could be a local construction company or another NGO). GK managed directly 
the construction, although they tried to promote the beneficiaries participation during the construction, it was not 
possible due to the time constrains. OH built the houses under permanent supervision of HFHP. The FCCC 
directly contacted the supplier of the pre fabricated housing in China, and this company sent personnel who 
worked together with local workers on the assembling of the housing units, consequently the construction time 
was shorter.  
    Table 5 shows the progress of permanent housing construction in Cagayan de Oro. The houses were built 
mainly following the ADRRS, the reasons for this tendency are explained in section 4.2.4. However, there are 
two issues observed in the following table that are important: The difference between the planned and finished 
housing units, currently mainly NGOs are working on the construction of housing, and the local government is 
managing the acquisition of new land that can be appropriate in order to fulfill the housing needs. The second 
issue observed is the difference between the finished and occupied housing, this respond to the delay in the 
provision of basic infrastructure and/or services, and the other reason is the inappropriate location of the houses 
in landslide prone areas that forced residents to abandon houses, for instance FCCC and LGU houses in 
Calaanan site were severely affected during rain seasons. In addition the lack of accessibility and possible 
vulnerability of the site discouraged residents to move in the permanent houses, for instance there are 300 
housing units built by FCCC in Calaanan site which remain unoccupied. 
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Table 5: Summary of Permanent housing progress in Cagayan de Oro as of July 5th, 2014. 
Reconst.
approach
Constructor
Land 
Owner
Funding
Housing 
Typology
Houses 
Planned 
Houses 
Finished
Occupied
No % No % No %
ADRRS
HFHP/GK/ 
OH/FCCC/ 
LGU/others 
LGU, private, 
Religious 
Org. 
DSWD, 
NHA, 
private, 
others 
Quadruplex/ 
duplex/Row 
house/Single 
Detached
9,699 86.4 6,614 83.2 5,116 79.7
ADRIS
Red 
Cross/IOM 
IDPs 
Red Cross/
IOM 
Single 
Detached
1,268 11.3 1,268 15.9 1,268 19.7
CDR
SHFC/ 
DSWD 
CMP/
various 
NASA/ 
DSWD 
Single 
Detached
258 2.3 70 0.9 37 0.6
TOTALS
Land Area 90.48 has. + in 
process to purchase + IDPs 
owned land 
No. of houses needed 
8,559 units 11,225 7,952 6,421 
Source: Based on NHA, [20] 
4.3.3 Provision of facilities 
    The construction of the houses started simultaneously with the infrastructure works, then in many cases even 
the houses were completed but there were no basic services provided (like drainage and water supply) because of 
the infrastructure works were still ongoing. For later projects, infrastructure was built before housing. 
    For the provision of individual facilities, the National Building Code of the Philippines requires to provide 
septic tanks as part of sanitation, which each implementing agency has to provide. Other services like water and 
electricity should be arranged through individual applications to the respective companies by the residents after 
they are allocated in the houses. In many sites temporary there are communal faucets for water supply.  
    Community facilities and services, such as communal centers, health centers, schools, police stations, and 
others, were provided after the houses were completed and the residents were allocated. The responsibility to 
provide these facilities varies from the correspondent government agency to the private sector or NGOs. 
4.3.4 Project Monitoring and Supervision 
    For the monitor and technical supervision of the projects, it was done by each NGO, constructor or any other 
implementing agency. And for the inspections the LGU monitored the progress and the number of houses 
completed due to the urgency to allocate the affected communities, but not the quality of the construction. 
Additionally, other agencies such the NHA or DSWD did inspections to the projects that they funded, this in 
coordination with the implementing agency or NGO. 
4.4 Use 
4.4.1 Beneficiaries’ allocation 
    After the completion of permanent housing, the LGU organized the allocation in groups of beneficiaries in the 
sites according to the progress of completed houses. The residents were granted to live in permanent housing 
through usufruct, where the beneficiaries have the right to reside but the government keeps the ownership of the 
lot and the house, and in case of private owned land, the owners of the land have the ownership of the house. 
    The first batch of houses was completed four months after the disaster and beneficiaries transferred in April 
2012 when they were granted with a Certificate of Occupancy. Those who received these certificates were also 
asked to sign a waiver that they are giving up rights to their original settlement along the river. 
4.4.2 Post occupancy support 
    Once the communities were resettled in the new sites, there are different community support activities that are 
conducted, where one of the main concerns is the creation of livelihood opportunities. The promoters of these 
activities are the LGU, DSWD and the NGOs who built the houses. 
4.4.3 Maintenance 
    Once the residents moved in the houses they are responsible of the maintenance of the house. Implementing 
Agencies (NGOs) considered some flexibility in the design of the houses, mainly the construction of a 
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mezzanine to be used as bed or store space, or the roofing of service areas at the back of the core houses, but 
these were considered to be built by residents or in collaboration with other NGOs or civil organizations. 
4.4.4 Change of use/adaptation/modification 
    Finally, the residents started to build extensions of the houses based on their needs, although in the agreement 
signed prior to their transfer to the houses it is specified that the construction of these extensions are not allowed. 
In addition, some NGOs provided mezzanines or lofts that can be used as bedroom or storage. In settlements 
where there is no potable water, NGOs provided water collection tanks (Fig. 6). 
                            a)                                                           b)                                                         c) 
Fig. 6: (a) Informal Extensions built by residents;  (b) Mezzanine build by a local NGO; (c) rain water collection 
tanks provided by other NGOs. Source: Author 
5. Discussion: 
    During the resettlement process in Cagayan de Oro, there were various issues that emerged and provided 
positive and negative feedbacks for the performance of the management and progress of the resettlement. 
5.1 Disaster as trigger for resettlement 
    The squatter areas established in Cagayan de Oro, were located in highly vulnerable areas, whose residents 
permanently suffered floods; evidenced the lack of pre-disaster measures to assure their safety. The possible 
effects of a typhoon with the intensity of Washi were repeatedly warned, however there was no action taken by 
the LGU. Thus, Washi induced the resettlement induced and was unavoidable. 
    It is still necessary to plan for the future resettlement and protection projects for vulnerable areas outside the 
No-Built zones, since the residents formally occupy the land and they are not the first priority for resettlement. 
5.2 Timeliness 
    The first group of beneficiaries was transferred to permanent houses on 28 April 2012, four months after the 
TS Washi, during the visit of President Aquino. This is unusually fast for post-disaster resettlement. For instance 
the resettlement after the Great East Japan Tsunami that hit the Tohoku Region in March 2011, according to the 
reconstruction and recovery plans it is specified the beginning of construction of permanent housing after 2 years 
of the disaster [22]. In Sri Lanka, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the construction of first group of permanent 
housing started five months after the disaster [23], see Fig. 7. 
Fig. 7: Comparison of Post-Disaster Resettlement projects in Cagayan de Oro, Sri Lanka and Japan 
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    Analyzing the timeline of the reconstruction and resettlement after Washi (Fig. 8) the immediate measures 
after the disaster were taken timely, with the priority to provide permanent housing; however there were also an 
overlapping of stages that in normal time without the pressure and stress caused by a disaster should be 
considered as a priority, for instance, the provision of basic services and infrastructure should be finished before 
residents move in the permanent housing. 
Fig. 8: Timeline of Post Washi Housing Resettlement Process 
5.3 Land availability 
    One of the challenges in the resettlement of communities affected by disasters is to find the land for the new 
settlements. Then, it was remarkable that previous local administrations in Cagayan de Oro purchased land 
through the system of land banking. As a result, the availability of land allowed the quick start of the 
construction of permanent houses in resettlement sites and the allocation of the first groups of residents after four 
months. The situation was different in the city of Iligan that was also severely affected by Washi, where the LGU 
faced the lack of land for the new settlements. 
    However, due to the pressure for quick results, some steps where omitted, like the appropriate land 
classification regarding the safety and suitability for housing. This was evidenced in the houses located in 
landslide prone areas that were severely damaged during rain seasons in some relocation sites. This forced a 
second relocation of the families allocated in these houses. 
5.4 Land suitability 
    Geo-hazard assessment, especially for relocation sites developed earlier, was mostly viewed as a compliance 
step and not as a critical aspect of ensuring reduction of exposure to hazards of the relocated residents. This step 
is often skipped or shortcuts made especially if the site is owned by local government, also because of time 
constraints and limited staffs of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). MGB in Region 10 only has two 
geo-hazard specialists currently working on 44 pending geo-hazard assessment applications. The MGB policy 
for geo-hazard assessment needs stricter implementation, and MGB needs greater support to do this. 
    The pressure to develop site and built housing in the shorter term, promoted the quick construction of houses 
without confirming the appropriateness and safety of the land. For instance houses that were built in landslide 
prone areas (hills) in Calaanan Site were severely damaged during the heavy rains and typhoon seasons, 15 
housing built by the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 22 built by the LGU (Fig. 9) are considered 
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not livable. Consequently, the residents had to be transferred again to a temporary housing and later to an 
available housing unit in the same or in different sites. 
       
                                  a)                                                               b)                                                  c) 
Fig. 9: Abandoned houses in a landslide-prone area, (a) built by FCCC.); (b) (c) built by LGU. Source: Author 
5.5 Lack of technical supervision during construction 
    As it was recognized by the LGU officials, due to the limited staffs in the Office of Building Official, it was 
not possible to supervise regularly the construction quality of the houses in relocation sites, although this office 
is responsible to issue the building permits and supervise during the construction. Then the different inspections 
from DSWD, NHA and LGU were only centered in the progress of construction and number of housing units 
finished. Consequently there are different technical deficiencies in permanent sites in resettlement sites, like 
cracks in the walls and the risk of collapse of the bank walls, even with the reinforcement of the soil slope. 
    Another issue reported by the Ateneo de Manila University [18], the roofs of some houses flew off during 
Typhoon Bopha (that hit Cagayan de Oro in December 2012) only one month after the beneficiaries transferred 
to the permanent houses. In an inspection conducted by the United Architects of the Philippines it was observed 
that the rivets, trusses and purlins were not strong enough to withstand the strong winds during. Finally the repair 
works were carried out by the NGO that built these houses. 
5.6 Improvements in the process 
    During the process there were changes in the approach based on the feedback from the first resettlement sites. 
For instance, initially the priority for the design of the settlement was to maximize the use of the land for the 
construction of housing, resulting a higher density in the settlements, which is against the residents comfort and 
needs due to the limited space. This approached changed in the last projects where in coordination with the LGU 
instead of quadruplex or row houses now single detached houses are being built. 
    In the first sites the construction of infrastructure and houses were simultaneous, that caused diverse problems 
once the beneficiaries were allocated due to the lack of these services (water, electricity), the approach for the 
last projects is to provide the infrastructure and services first and then start the construction of houses, then after 
the beneficiaries are allocated they have access to the basic services. 
5.7 Stakeholders’ participation and leadership 
    The selection of resettlement as the main approach for housing recovery was promoted by the top-down 
approach. Thus, decisions were taken in multi-stakeholder meetings of the LIAC, regulated by national laws and 
codes; established guidelines and procedures of government agencies involved, and internal procedures of NGOs 
and other implementing agencies. This encourages the capacity building of each stakeholder, collaboration 
among them, and the leadership of local government (Fig. 10). 
    However as it is expected in any post-disaster recovery process, the local government is the one who take the 
leadership during the different stages of reconstruction, and the regional offices of the national governmental 
agencies, like DSWD and NHA, closely supported the LGU from their field of expertise. In case of Cagayan de 
Oro, the other stakeholders’ inputs were given in coordination but in some cases directly or indirectly influenced 
by the government officers’ decisions, giving few opportunities to the locals to make their voices heard. 
    As a result there was limited involvement from affected communities and there were many restrictions for the 
adoption of locally appropriate solutions for the design and construction of permanent housing. Moreover, it 
denied the potentials for community empowerment and sustainable development of resettled families. This 
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resulted in an increase of the “sense of dependency” from external support (such as LGU, government agencies 
like DSWD, NGOs and volunteers), because during the resettlement there was no priority for the creation of 
livelihood opportunities that should be considered as integral part of the relocation planning. 
Fig. 10: Stakeholders’ Participation in the Resettlement Process 
5.8 Security of land and housing tenure 
    The households in resettlement sites were awarded with a “Certificate of Occupancy” that allows them to 
reside in the provided housing through the system called “usufruct”. Although the beneficiaries cannot be 
evicted during the term of the contract (usually from 25 to 50 years), this does not provide formal ownership to 
beneficiaries, and even the contract can be cancelled if there is a severe violation of the occupancy conditions. 
Therefore land and housing are officially property of the LGU or the private institution which own the land, and 
currently there is no legal framework to transfer these properties to beneficiaries. Without security of land and 
housing tenure, resettled families remain vulnerable to future evictions, displacement, and would hinder the 
development of the communities because of the continuation of the dependency on external aid. 
6. Conclusions 
    The large flow of migrants, the rapid growth of the city, the establishment of informal settlements or squatter 
areas in the proximities of rivers’ banks, determined the vulnerabilities that threaten the local residents. In 
addition to the lack of an integral disaster management measures that must be integrated not only to post-disaster 
response, but prevention, mitigation and by the adoption of pro-active measures. This caused the massive 
destruction of the city after the disaster. 
    This question the efficiency of the “event-basis” approach for disaster response and the reactive actions, for 
instance it is only after TS Washi that a Disaster Risk Reduction Management office (DRRM) was created in the 
LGU. Another issue is the lack of clear guidelines for housing reconstruction or resettlement. Therefore it 
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hinders any self-criticism and feedback from previous experiences for the improvement of the resettlement 
management based on the current experiences in Cagayan de Oro. 
    There were different housing reconstruction approaches adopted for post TS Washi recovery. The focus is the 
Agency-Driven Reconstruction in Relocation Site, top-down process, where the local government directly 
influenced the decisions taken during different stages and took the leadership in the inter-agency. This promoted 
the improvement in the capacities of different offices involved and the implementation of disaster preparedness 
activities through the Disaster Risk Reduction Management office.  
    Additionally, since it was evident that the advantage to have public land for emergency use which enabled 
timeliness in the construction and allocation of permanent housing. Subsequently, the current administration is 
working on purchasing land to continue with the land banking initiatives. 
    Local governments should clarify the policies to ensure the land and housing security to households in 
resettled sites, arrange the formal transfer of the property rights to residents and promote the sustainable 
development of these new communities. 
    Resettlement is adopted in more recent disaster recovery processes in the Philippines; thus, the lessons learned 
from the management of the resettlement in Cagayan de Oro can be useful to improve the actions that should 
consider the inclusion of affected communities in the process. 
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